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Abstract 
 
There is very little micro-economic evidence on corporate financial behaviour in the 
East Asian countries in the period before the crisis of 1997. Using a large firm level 
panel data-set from four Asian countries, this paper compares the rates of return to 
various internal and external sources of finance. Using debt-equity ratio as an 
indicator, we distinguish between financially constrained and unconstrained firms and 
obtain selectivity-corrected random effects estimates of rates of return to internal and 
external funds. These estimates suggest evidence of significant misallocation of 
capital. While rates of return to debt finance are positive among Korean and 
Indonesian firms with low debt-equity ratios, they are negative among those with high 
debt-equity ratio. Moreover, returns to debt are always negative among Thai firms 
irrespective of their retention or debt-equity ratios. While these results contrast some 
of the existing results, they seem to complement the moral hazard arguments put 
forward by the macro literature on the recent Asian crisis. 
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DO EXTERNAL FUNDS YIELD LOWER RETURNS?  
RECENT EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Following the recent Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, there has been a surge of 
literature primarily based on aggregate macroeconomic framework. Many of these 
studies highlight the problem of moral hazard as the common source of over-
investment and excessive external borrowing encouraged by various deep-rooted 
institutional deficiencies (e.g., Krugman, 1998c; Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 
1999a). There is however very little microeconomic evidence on the moral hazard 
argument reflected in the poor corporate performance and growth in these countries 
during the period leading to the crisis. Two important exceptions are Claessens et al. 
(2000) and Driffield and Pal (2001), both of whom employ the firm-level Worldscope 
database. Claessens et al. (2000) analyse corporate performance in terms of firm’s 
profit margin on sales among companies in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand 
before and after the crisis, and in two comparator countries Hong Kong and 
Singapore. They suggested that firm-specific characteristics, both financial (e.g., 
leverage ratio, share of short-term debt in total debt, ownership concentration) and 
non-financial (e.g., sales margin, real sales growth), and idiosyncratic rather than 
aggregate shocks (instrumented by industry and country dummy variables) played a 
significant role. Driffield and Pal (2001) examined the nature of corporate investment 
and found evidence of significant misallocation of capital in the region not only in 
terms of excess investment financed through cash flow in Indonesia, but also that 
through debt and equity in the cases of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. 
 The present paper makes a further attempt to examine the efficiency with 
which internal and external funds were used by these east Asian firms during the 
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period leading to the crisis. This is an important exercise because it would offer a 
micro-economic foundation of the common macro-economic argument of excessive 
borrowing and over-investment in east Asia during the crisis period. Even in the 
context of the wider literature, this is a challenging task, as there are theoretical 
arguments suggesting that returns to external finances may be higher (Baumol et al. 
1970) or lower (Jensen, 1986; De Meza and Webb, 1987). This has however not been 
tested for the east Asian firms in our sample. While Baumol et al. (1970) did not 
distinguish between firms with and without financial constraint, we argue that it is 
important to do so, especially in imperfect market conditions with information 
problems. Using unique random effects panel data models with selection, we 
determine the selectivity-corrected rates of return among firms with and without 
financial constraint and compare these rates of returns from various internal and 
external finances.   
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical and the applied literature on efficiency of investment in imperfect, as 
opposed to perfect capital markets. This highlights some identification problems that 
we attempt to redress in our empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines the data that are 
employed in this analysis, while section 4 describes the Tobit selection model used to 
determine the selectivity-corrected rates of return from various internal and external 
funds. Results are discussed in section 5 while section 6 concludes.  
 
 
 
2. Efficiency and rates of return from internal and external funds 
 
There is a now a growing literature on the financing of corporate investment in a 
world characterised by capital market imperfections (for a survey, see Schiantarelli, 
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1996). This section critically reviews the literature on the relative efficiency of 
investment financed by various internal and external sources in imperfect capital 
markets.  
Under the Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958), internal and external funds are 
perfect substitutes, and firm investment decisions are independent of the source of 
finance. Thus all firms are assumed to have equal access to capital markets. 
Conventional representative firm models may apply to the mature companies with 
well-known prospects. However, financial factors appear to matter for other firms, 
especially in the short run. These disparities in the access to capital are generally 
rationalised in terms of problems of contract enforcement and informational 
asymmetries. Thus sources of financing are expected to influence firms’ investment 
decisions under capital market imperfections. The Pecking Order hypothesis, for 
example, argues that the availability of internally generated funds determines the 
amount and type of external financing to be used. There is now a substantial literature 
that offers a micro-foundation of the link between a firm’s financial structure and real 
investment in terms of transaction costs, tax advantages, agency problems, costs of 
financial distress and asymmetric information (see Driffield and Pal, 2001 for a 
survey of this literature).  
Market imperfections also affect the rates of return to internal and external 
funds, reflecting various costs of market failure. One common argument in this 
respect emerges from the development of the managerial theories of the firm 
emphasizing the fact that managerial interests may often diverge from those of the 
shareholders. For example, managers who control large internal sources of finance are 
more likely to pursue their own goal of firm growth and invest in projects whose 
returns are lower than shareholders could obtain elsewhere. However, firms who raise 
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funds externally are closely monitored by the financial markets and hence are more 
likely to act in shareholders’ interests. The early analysis of Baumol, et al (1970) 
lends some support to this hypothesis: although retained earnings have positive rates 
of return, investment financed by equity issues earns significantly higher rates of 
return. These differences are argued to be consistent with the differentials in 
transaction costs since these costs are the highest for external equity and lowest for 
retained earnings.  
However the choice between debt and equity is not unambiguous. Relative to 
gross proceeds, the cost of a new share issue (including registration fees, taxes, selling 
and administrative expenses) can vary substantially by the size of the offering where 
the costs of small offerings can be high. The design of the corporate tax system has 
also attributed to a cost advantage to internal finance over external equity finance. 
King (1977) and Auerbach (1979) argued that shareholders benefit from externally 
financed projects only if marginal q exceeds unity while projects financed through 
retentions need only a q less than unity. Asymmetric information may generate further 
costs for external equity finance. For example, Myers and Majluf (1984) consider the 
impact of asymmetric information when new investors are less informed about the 
value of the firm than existing shareholders; the latter may give rise to the problem of 
under-investment. The firm will not carry out a project with a positive net present 
value (NPV) if the under pricing of the new capital, caused by asymmetric 
information, is higher than the value of the project. In this case, firms will use a 
Pecking Order of funds where the least risky form of financing is preferred. 
Debt finance, particularly, long-term debt, may create agency problems 
because of the limited liability of debt contracts. The latter may induce the firm 
managers to act against the interests of creditors and may lead to over investment in 
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projects with negative NPV (e.g., see De Meza and Webb, 1987). Jensen (1986) 
suggests that conflicts of interest between shareholders and mangers over pay-out 
policies are severe when the organization produces substantial free cash flow. Thus 
firms may engage in projects with negative (NPV) because managers may like to 
pursue growth. However, use of debt rather than equity could redress this problem of 
over investment by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of 
the managers. Debt creation, without retention of the proceeds of the issue, enables 
managers to effectively bond their promise to pay out future cash flows that cannot be 
accomplished by simple dividend increases. In doing so they give shareholder 
recipients the right to take the firm into bankruptcy court if they do not maintain their 
promise to make the interest and principal payments. Hadlock (1998) extends this 
argument, suggesting that there are significant asymmetries within this framework 
related to insider holdings, such that firms with large insider holdings are far less 
prone to over investment. Hubbard et al. (1995) demonstrate that over investment is a 
feature of low-dividend firms.  
 Thus misallocation of capital is likely to occur under imperfect market 
conditions, and may be reflected in the differential rates of return to various internal 
and external sources of finance. Even when equity or debt is used, agency Agency 
problems may persistoccur in these both debt and equity markets, often leading to 
which in turn would imply lower returns to external finance compared with retained 
earnings or investment funded through cash. The theoretical literature s, contrasting 
contrasts with the findings of Baumol et al. (1970), though the applied literature that 
seeks to test the implications of these problems is relatively small. We are not aware 
of any study that examines the implications of these agency problems for returns to 
debt or equity financing. It is however an important issue for the East Asian firms 
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because of the alleged problem of excessive bad loans leading to over-investment 
during the periods leading to the recent crisis of late 1997. It is in this context we shall 
compare  returns to long-term debt with those to other sources of finance for the 
sample firms.  
More importantly, the existing empirical studies including the early paper of 
Baumol et al., 1970, seem to ignore an important selection problem that may arise in 
analysing efficiency with which internal and external funds are used by the corporate 
sector. Firms that are performing well, may find it easier to raise finance in markets 
characterised by imperfections and/or asymmetric information, in the form of debt 
and/or equity, and will (one assumes) have greater levels of funds for new investment. 
Thus uncorrected estimates of rate of return will be  biased.  
There are various criteria commonly used to identify financially constrained 
firms for whom information and agency problems are more severe. These include 
firm size (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), retention ratio (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 
1988), dividend pay out ratio (Fazzari et al. 1988), debt-equity ratio (Agung, 2000) 
and one or more of the above. The basic problem with testing for financial constraints 
in the context of Q models is that average Q may be a very imprecise proxy for the 
shadow value of an additional unit of new capital. Whited (1992), Bond and Meghir 
(1994), Hubbard et al. (1995) use Euler equations for capital to infer about financing 
constraints from this. The latter avoids relying on measures of profitability based on 
firms’ market value. However, this approach still requires certain assumptions, most 
notably that the tightness of the relevant constraints is more or less time invariant.  
As an alternative, we shall, in this paper, adopt a two-stage approach. We first 
determine the variation in the degree of financial constraints faced by a particular firm 
and then calculate the selectivity-corrected rates of return from various internal and 
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external sources of finance among firms with and without constraint. This approach 
allows us to examine our central hypothesis i.e., if the corrected rates of return are 
higher for externally funded investments in our sample since managers are more 
closely monitored by financial markets.  
 
 
2. Data and Econometric Modelling 
2.1. Data 
The data used here are described, and presented at length in Driffield and Pal (2001). 
Here we provide a brief synopsis: As already indicated, our analysis is based on the 
Worldscope data obtained from four eastern Asian countries, namely, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, and covers the period 1989-97. We focus on the 
investment behaviour of listed non-financial firms (classified as industrial, utility and 
transportation in this data-set). This provides an unbalanced panel of over 5000 
observations, broken down as follows: 
 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand 
Firms 
included 
112 256 331 201 
Observations 662 1535 1983 1130 
 
Identifying over-investing firms requires an ex post indicator, as clearly this is not 
announced at the time. One measure that has been commonly used in this respect is 
Tobin’s q (e.g., Lang, Stultz and Walking, 1991; Doukas, 1995). Conceptually 
marginal q is an indicator of a firm’s optimum investment opportunities. However, 
given that marginal q is unobservable, researchers have used average q instead. If 
average q < 1, firms are identified to be over-investing. It should however be noted 
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that our sample countries were at different stages of financial liberalisation and were 
implementing different macroeconomic policies. As such stock market valuations 
across countries may be different. Hence the q ratio is used here merely as a relative 
measure within each country, rather than as an absolute measure across countries (the 
descriptive statistics for the q ratios for the countries are given in table A2). Subject to 
these clarifications, we find that the degree of over-investment varied among these 
countries over the sample period. For example, while only about 35% of Indonesian 
firms were over investing, all the Korean firms were found to be doing so according 
to this criterion. Also a significant proportion of Malaysian (50%) and Thai firms 
(59%) were over investing in our sample. Thus there is evidence of misallocation of 
capital in our sample (see further discussion in Driffield and Pal, 2001). In the rest of 
this paper we would like to examine how this misallocation of capital has affected the 
rates of return to various internal and external funds. 
 
 
2.2. Econometric Modelling 
The central focus of this paper is to determine the efficiency of various internal and 
external funds. Efficiency is measured here by the rates of return (/K) to different 
types of funds1, namely cash flow, retained earnings and reserves, long-term debt and 
equity (all financing variables are expressed as share of capital (K) prevailing in the 
beginning of the period). Thus, following Baumol et al (1970), we estimate the basic 
reduced form equation of firm-level efficiency: 
 
                                                 
1 Besides pure returns to capital, one may also consider alternative measures of firm level efficiency, for example, 
total factor productivity. However, due to the poor quality of employment data within this data set, we do not have 
much confidence in any measures of total factor productivity that can be generated. As an alternative, we construct 
a measure of (average) capital productivity at the firm level, that is to say, firm’s value added / capital stock and 
examine how it is related to various kinds of internal and external finance. The results from this specification are 
presented in Appendix table A1 and discussed in footnote 4. 
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LTD
K
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K
CASH
K
 43210    (1) 
 
   
In our empirical work, the rate of return is defined as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets of the firm. The underlying idea is that annual 
earnings before interest and taxes are generated from the levels of investment in the 
past period and that is why it would  capture the efficiency of investment funded by 
different internal and external sources.2 The sources-of-finance variables (e.g., cash, 
retained earnings and reserves, new equity and long-term debt) are defined in the 
usual way (e.g., see Driffield and Pal, 2001) and expressed as share of capital in the 
beginning of the year. The capital stock is taken to be the value of plant and 
equipment at the beginning of the year while investment is the current value of capital 
expenditure that adds to the capital stock of the firm.  
 
A Random Effects Model with Sample Selection 
As indicated earlier, a simple model as represented by equation (1) would be subject 
to selection bias since different firms have different abilities to raise funds (internal 
and/or external). We therefore propose a model of selection, allowing for the fact that 
both demand and supply factors affect the ability of firms to raise different types of 
internal and external finance. This employs a unique random effects model with 
sample selection (e.g., see Verbeek and Numan, 1992)3. First we use a univariate 
                                                                                                                                            
 
2 In this respect these estimates of efficiency are expected to be symmetric to the estimates of investment (e.g., see 
Driffield and Pal, 2001) . See further discussion in section 3.   
 
3 This is a complex type of panel data model. We are not aware of any application of this model in the corporate 
finance literature. The only application that we are aware of applies the model to the case of Swedish agricultural 
production (Heshmati, 1997). 
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probit selection equation to determine if the ith firm, I = 1,…., N is facing any 
financial constraint in period t = 1, …., T:   
 
F*it = ’X1it + di + 1it    (2) 
                   
The latent variable Fit*  represents the financial structure of the firm, and is observed 
along with Xit when the selection variable Fit= 1  if  F*it > 0 and Fit= 0 otherwise. 
We have experimented with different possible indicators of firm’s financial 
constraint including retention ratio, debt-equity ratio and also debt plus equity 
(external finance) as a share of capital. We however had problems of getting 
reasonable sample size with retention ratio and also share of external finance for all 
cases. For example, there were very small number of firms with low retention in 
Indonesia and high retention in Thailand. Also when we used share of external 
finance as an indicator of financial constraint, it was noted that al Indonesian firms 
used some debt and/or equity while only a minority of firms in the other three sample 
countries used no external finance.4  As a result in our final analysis, we have used 
debt-equity ratio to be the indicator of a firm’s financial constraint. In particular, it 
can be argued that firms with more debt, i.e., those with debt-equity ratio greater than 
unity are less constrained than those with low debt-equity ratio.  
The choice of explanatory variables for such selection equation employed in 
the literature, thus far appears to have been done on the basis of “letting the data 
speak”. Rather, we rely simply on the well-understood determinants of firm 
performance taken from the industrial organisation literature, following Clarke, 
Davies and Waterson (1984) or Gale and Branch (1982). Thus, we employ output-
capital ratio as a measure of firm level efficiency and firm size as an indicator of 
                                                 
4 Only about 11-15% firms in each sample country did not use any external finance. 
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market power in determining whether a firm is financially constrained or not. Firm 
size is expected to influence the ability of firms to raise investment capital (also, see 
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). Our selection equation therefore employs the debt-equity 
ratio, modelled as a function of firm size (based on total sales) and output-capital 
ratio.  
After selecting the firms with high debt-equity ratio (i.e., Fit=1), at the second 
stage we employ a random effects model to determine the rates of return (Rit) from 
various sources of internal and external funds (X2it) among the selected firms. The 
general formulation of the rate of return equation is as follows: 
Rit = ’X2it + ci + 2it    (3) 
where (Rit, X2it) are observed only when Fit = 1.  
As such, ’ represents the marginal (rather than average) rate of return. 2it is 
assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and a constant variance 2 and 
Cov(1it, 2it) = . For simplicity, ci , di are assumed to be uncorrelated and normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variances 2c, 2d respectively. One can 
repeat the same procedure to determine the rates of return for firms with Fit = 0.  
The contribution of the i-th group to the log-likelihood is:  
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The joint likelihood function is the sum total of the contribution of each group 
likelihood function. We reparameterize the log-likelihood function and also isolate the 
two constant terms so that the slope vectors do not contain the constant terms. We 
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maximise the log-likelihood function using Newton iteration and obtain the parameter 
estimates of s, s, 5 and . Given the complex nature of the likelihood function, 
convergence may be difficult to obtain, especially if the sample size is small.   
 In order to avoid the important endogeneity problem of sample selection, we 
use one period lagged values of explanatory variables in both stages of regression. 
This highlights one of the advantages of these types of models over much of the 
earlier analysis, where results were beset by endogeneity problems. Inclusion of 
lagged explanatory variables, however, would mean that for each firm the first 
observation would be missing. We exclude these missing observation to obtain 
meaningful estimations.  
 
3. Results 
Table 1 summarises the uncorrected random effects estimates of rates of return on 
various internal and external funds for all firms. Table 2 summarises the selectivity-
corrected estimates among firms with high debt-equity ratio while Table 3 does the 
same for those with low debt-equity ratio. In each case all the explanatory variables 
are one-period lagged values of the variables, which in turn implies that the first 
observation of each firm in all countries will have a missing value of these lagged 
variables. We have excluded these missing observations to get meaningful estimates 
in all cases. Total observations (with and without missing observations) are shown in 
each case in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3.  
 
3.1. Returns to internal and external finances   
                                                 
5 This would capture the significance of unobserved heterogeneity in rate of return equation. In particular, 
unobsreved heterogeneity would include factors creating agency costs, e.g., firms were able to get loans from 
banks or if shareholders were unwilling to fund additional investment.  
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Table 1 shows that returns to external funds, namely long-term debt are significantly 
lower than those to some internal funds in all of the selected countries. Returns to 
equity too are significantly negative in Indonesia and Thailand. The only exception is 
Korea which earns a significantly positive returns to equity over this period. In 
contrast, returns to cash flow are significantly positive in all sample countries except 
Korea; Indonesian firms also earned a significantly positive returns to retained 
earnings and reserves. These results however change as we consider the selectivity 
corrected random effects estimates in these countries.  
Table 2 and Table 3 show the selectivity corrected random effects estimates of 
returns on assets. In each case the standard deviation of the residual term in the rate of 
return equation is positive and significant. This captures the significance of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the determination of rates of return. We also find a 
significantly negative correlation coefficient between the residual terms in the 
selection and the returns equations (except Malaysia when DE=1), suggesting the 
general trend that a higher debt-equity ratio is likely to be associated with a lower rate 
of return.  
Generally larger firms have incurred higher debt, i.e., have greater access to 
external finance in all sample countries. More efficient firms, i.e., firms with higher 
output-capital ratios have lower debt in Indonesia, but higher debt in Korea; the 
coefficient is insignificant in Malaysia and Thailand. Clearly there are some  
differences in estimates of returns to internal and external finances among firms with 
and without financial constraint.  A comparison of estimates presented in Table 2 and 
Table 3 suggest some significant differences in rates of return estimates, especially 
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with respect to returns to equity in Korea and Malaysia and returns to long-term debt 
in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand.  
We first consider the returns to internal and external finances among 
financially unconstrained firms, i.e., those with high debt-equity ratio. Returns to cash 
flow are positive and significant in all countries except Korea while those to retained 
earnings and reserves are positive in all countries except Thailand (the coefficient is 
insignificant in Korea). Considering external finances, returns to equity are negative 
in all countries except Korea (where it is positive and significant) while those to long 
term debt are negative (though these coefficients are insignificant in Malaysia and 
Thailand). Thus more efficient investments among these firms with high debt-equity 
ratio are those funded by internal sources and/or equity finance. The latter perhaps 
reflects the problem of deposit insurance and over-reliance on debt leading to over 
investment in Korea and Thailand.6  
Secondly, we consider the firms who are financially constrained, i.e., those 
with low debt equity ratio. In this case, returns to cash flow are significant and 
positive for firms in all sample countries while those to retained earning are positive 
in Indonesia and negative in Thailand (these coefficients are insignificant in Korea 
and Malaysia). Rates of return to both long-term debt and equity finances are 
significantly negative in Indonesia and Thailand; returns to equity in Korea and that to 
long term debt in Malaysia are still negative. Returns to debt in Korea is however 
positive and significant. In this respect it is worth highlighting the Korean case: rates 
of return to equity are significantly positive among firms with high leverage, but 
negative with those with low leverage; similarly, rates of return to long-term debt are 
negative among firms with high leverage, but positive among firms with low leverage. 
                                                 
6 Using Tobin’s q as a measure of over-investment, Driffield and Pal (2001) find that all the Korean firms in our 
sample were over-investing during 1994 and 1997. Also see Appendix Table A1 for the distribution of q.  
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Taken together, these firm-level random effects estimates indicate the persistence of 
misallocation of external funds among both financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms in the periods leading to the crisis. 
 
 
3.2. Efficiency and returns to long term debt 
Driffield & Pal (2001) demonstrate that capital market imperfections impact on 
investment levels in different ways among the East Asian countries. In particular, 
during the period leading up to the Asian Crisis firms in Thailand and Korea engaged 
in over investment, primarily funded by external debt. Results presented here also 
suggest that rates of returns to external finances, particularly to long term debt, are 
low. The point estimates presented in Tables 2 and 3 consistently suggest that of the 
marginal return to long-term debt (LTD) has been negative in most cases (except for 
Korean firms with low debt-equity ratio). In order to further examine the issue of 
efficiency of investment funded by long term debt, it is necessary to compute the 
marginal returns and marginal costs of long term debt. If the cost of capital 
consistently exceeds these rates of return, then concerns remain over the efficiency 
with which long term debt is used.  
In order to do this, it is necessary to derive a measure of rate of return to long 
term debt. In the absence of a better measure of return to long term debt, we adopt the 
following procedure. In terms of the simplest relationship (1), marginal return to long-
term debt (as a share of capital) is given by :  
.
)/(
)/(^
4 KLTDd
Kd   
 
Using the estimate of 4 in Table 1,  one can obtain the predicted return to LTD (as a 
share of capital) as:  
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Average costs of long-term debt are measured by the effective interest rate faced by 
an individual firm in a given year, where the effective interest rate is measured as the 
total interest expenses as a ratio of total debt.  
Finally, we construct a measure of (in)efficiency as follows:  
  EFF = Effective interest rate - Predicted return from LTD 
and consider the distribution of EFF for all firms in the four sample countries. This 
enables a comparison between the predicted returns to long term debt (as a ratio of 
total capital) and the average cost of capital (i.e., effective interest rate). There are 
clearly limits to the extent to which one could use such a comparison to draw 
inferences concerning the overall profitability of firms, or determine the rent that is 
extracted from the capital market, but the results are never the less instructive. Figures 
1a-1d present the distribution of the implied efficiency of long term debt for each of 
the countries.  
These figures illustrate the magnitudes of the measure of (in)efficiency of long 
term debt across sample firms in these selected countries. In each cases there are a 
significant number of observations with seemingly very high cost of capital, but 
allowing for this, the distributions of the efficiency of debt are very similar across the 
four countries. Malaysia and Korea have a large number of firms where the 
differential is very small, while the distributions for Thailand and Indonesia appear to 
be more normal. While in all cases there are large proportion of firms that have a 
significant deviation between returns and average costs of debt, the figures illustrate 
that in many cases this differential is exceptionally large. In all cases, the median 
differential is in the area of 10%, with relatively high proportions of firms having a 
significant difference between return to and cost of long term debt. 
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 Similar distributions were obtained when splitting the samples according debt-
equity ratios, (corresponding to estimates in Tables 2 & 3).7 However, the Korean 
case is noteworthy where the marginal rates of return to long term debt are different 
across the two groups. Distribution of EFF for the Korean firms with high and low 
debt-equity ratios are  shown in Figures 2a and 2b. These figures illustrate that for 
Korea there are more firms in the low debt-equity category, but that the distributions 
across the two groups is very similar. Both groups are essentially bi-modal, though 
crucially the low debt-equity firms have a large group with no deviation between cost 
and return (or in some cases marginal return exceeds average cost). This suggests that 
some firms are unable to raise capital, despite performing well, while the majority 
have excessive levels of investment funded by debt where the cost of capital exceeds 
the return. This provides further evidence of misallocation of long term debt in Korea.  
  
 Finally, we examine if there was a variation in average EFF over time in these 
countries. In this respect, we compare the distributions of average EFF over time 
among the sample countries, which are summarised in Figures 3a -3d.  
 It does follow that the average EFF varied over time in all countries. The 
minimum average EFF was found in Thailand (just around 5) prior to 1991 while the 
corresponding minima were about 7 in Malaysia (1990), 7.5 in Korea (1990) and 10 
in Indonesia (1989). However, just before the crisis in 1996 the average measure of 
capital inefficiency (EFF) was 10 or higher  in Indonesia (highest among the sample 
countries) and Thailand  and around 8 in Korea and Malaysia. In fact, the highest 
average is found in Indonesia in 1990 when it soared to about 19.   
                                                 
7 That is why we do not show these histograms, which will be available upon request. 
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Taken together, this analysis suggests that interest rates exceeded the 
corresponding rate of return to long term debt (sometimes the deviation was too high) 
for a large number of firms in all the sample countries, indicating significant 
deviations from efficiency of long term debt in the pre-1997 period. 
Thus our results refutes the central hypothesis that the returns to external 
finances, especially to debt, are higher than those to internal finances in this sample of 
East Asian countries in the pre 1997 period. In fact, our results seem to suggest the 
opposite, especially with respect to debt-financed projects. The latter perhaps reflects 
the role of national policies and institutions that created moral hazard by 
overprotecting the investors.  
These results also provide an obvious link to the moral hazard argument of the 
macro literature on the Asian crisis. In particular, Corsetti et al (1999a) demonstrate 
that the likelihood of “bailout” interventions by the governments in east Asia, can 
generate agency problems inducing excessively risky investment by firms. However, 
such bailouts are not sustainable in the presence of macro shocks, and as such, the 
over-investment exacerbates the size of a currency crisis. Several of the Asian 
countries concerned had engaged in high levels of investment, supported by a long 
tradition of public guarantees attached to private projects, in order to sustain high 
rates of growth. Corsetti et al (1999b) also showed that investment rates in these 
countries remained high, even in the presence of indicators of significant downturns 
in profitability. 
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5. Conclusions 
Despite a growing body of theoretical literature on misallocation of capital, there is 
only limited empirical evidence, especially for the emerging Asian countries. This 
paper examines the aspects of efficiency of corporate financing in four south-east 
Asian economies, namely, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, by comparing 
the rates of return to internal and external funds. In doing so, it employs unique 
random effects panel data model with sample selection and estimate the selectivity 
corrected estimates of rates of return to various internal and external funds among 
firms with and without financial constraints. This allows us to examine if returns to 
external finances are higher in these economies, which in turn provides some indirect 
link to the general macroeconomic argument of excessive borrowing/over investment 
in these economies in the period leading to the crisis. 
Results suggest significant evidence of misallocation especially with respect to 
external finances. We find that returns to long-term debt were significantly lower 
among Indonesian and Thai firms, irrespective of the debt-equity ratio while the 
problem was concentrated among Korean firms with high debt-equity ratio. There 
were also signs of misallocation of long-term debt among Malaysian firms with low 
leverage. These results were further confirmed in the analysis of efficiency of long 
term debt. We argue that the moral hazard problems in the capital markets played a 
significant part in inducing over-reliance on debt, which in turn is responsible for this 
low return to debt financing. Thus our results contrast those of Baumol et al (1970) in 
that returns to external finances (especially long term debt) are found to be lower, 
especially among firms relying heavily on external debt, in the period prior to the 
recent Asian crisis. This is further supported by the analysis of efficiency of long term 
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debt, which seem to complement the moral hazard argument put forward by the 
macro-economic literature on the recent Asian crisis. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Uncorrected random effects estimates of returns on assets 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand 
Intercept 8.80 ** 
(13.769) 
6.94 ** 
(33.882) 
8.18 ** 
(21.779) 
10.44 ** 
(14.499) 
Cash flow 8.26 * 
(2.576) 
-0.02  
(1.111) 
0.05 * 
(1.775) 
0.55 ** 
(12.278) 
Retained 
earnings and 
reserves 
2.94 * 
(2.837) 
0.0002  
(0.002) 
0.01  
(0.182) 
-1.52  
(1.106) 
Equity -0.44  
(1.371) 
0.19 ** 
(3.604) 
0.0003  
(0.019) 
-0.98 ** 
(12.422) 
Long-term 
debt 
-1.28 ** 
(4.056) 
-0.12 * 
(2.439) 
-0.32 ** 
(4.115) 
0.28 * 
(2.522) 
No. of obs 
Total 
Without missing 
observations 
 
662  
550 
 
1535  
1279 
 
1983  
1652 
 
1142  
941 
 
Note: Number in the parenthesis is the corresponding t-statistic. 
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Table 2. Selectivity corrected random effects estimates of returns on assets 
among financially constrained firms 
 
Estimates of DE as an indicator of financial constraint 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand 
Intercept 0.0012  
(0.006) 
1.41 ** 
(27.231) 
-1.38** 
(28.247) 
-0.24 ** 
(4.876) 
Firm size 0.007 ** 
(4.513) 
0.002 ** 
(10.102) 
0.006 ** 
(9.828) 
0.03 ** 
(10.997) 
Output –capital -0.6 ** 
(3.474) 
0.002 ** 
(2.985) 
0.001  
(0.953) 
0.001  
(0.633) 
Estimates of ROA among firms with DE=1, i.e., if debt-equity ratio > 1 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand 
Intercept 9.18 ** 
(20.228) 
7.13 ** 
(95.533) 
5.28 ** 
(25.492) 
8.13 ** 
(53.711) 
Cashflow 1.01 ** 
(4.701) 
-0.02 * 
(1.706) 
0.08 * 
(1.890) 
0.31 ** 
(6.463) 
Retained 
earnings & 
reserves 
2.6 ** 
(3.80) 
0.24  
(1.073) 
2.04 * 
(2.829) 
-1.40 ** 
(4.430) 
Equity -1.05 ** 
(4.434) 
0.29 ** 
(6.314) 
-0.13 ** 
(4.268) 
-0.34 ** 
(3.211) 
Long-term 
debt 
-1.14** 
(6.626) 
-0.14 ** 
(3.935) 
-0.07  
(0.655) 
-0.07  
(0.523) 
Sigma 4.79 ** 
(32.178) 
3.57 ** 
(275.00) 
5.04 ** 
(82.480) 
4.24 ** 
(75.388) 
Rho -0.95 ** 
(81.674) 
-0.93 ** 
(92.068) 
0.01  
(0.274) 
-0.23 ** 
(5.030) 
Log-L -890.5675 -3249.039 -1953.941 -1873.951 
Selected 
sample 
236  
(211) 
1099  
(1041) 
414 
(399) 
469 
(457) 
 
Note: Number in the parenthesis is the corresponding t-statistic. 
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Table 3. Selectivity corrected random effects estimates of ROA among 
financially unconstrained firms 
 
Estimates of DE as an indicator of financial constraint 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand 
Intercept -0.19 * 
(1.792) 
-2.03 ** 
(27.029) 
1.54 ** 
(36.431) 
0.26 ** 
(5.129) 
Firm size 0.007 ** 
(6.073) 
-0.002 ** 
(11.947) 
-0.004 ** 
(10.410) 
-0.03 ** 
(12.465) 
Output -capital -0.43 ** 
(4.464) 
-0.006 ** 
(7.064) 
0.001 * 
(1.855) 
-0.003 ** 
(3.837) 
Estimates of ROA among firms with DE = 0, if debt-equity ratio <= 1 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand 
Intercept 8.9 ** 
(33.997) 
10.86 ** 
(51.154) 
8.45 ** 
(72.222) 
0.14 ** 
(66.637) 
Cashflow 1.12 ** 
(4.726) 
2.97 ** 
(10.840) 
0.09 ** 
(8.835) 
0.01 ** 
0.02 (8.014) 
Retained 
earnings & 
reserves 
4.18 ** 
(5.616) 
0.57  
(1.418) 
0.004  
(0.108) 
-0.06 * 
(2.381) 
Equity -1.65 ** 
(6.284) 
-0.87 ** 
(5.887) 
-0.01  
(1.133) 
-0.013 ** 
(10.530) 
Long-term 
debt 
-1.05 ** 
(5.719) 
0.15 * 
(1.988) 
-0.18 ** 
(3.543) 
-0.01 * 
(2.398) 
Sigma 4.84 ** 
(48.270) 
4.66 ** 
(67.951) 
6.5 ** 
(168.885) 
0.07 ** 
(61.686)** 
Rho -0.88 ** 
(44.117) 
-0.87 ** 
(46.191) 
-0.94 ** 
(134.328) 
-0.94 ** 
(103.199) 
Log-L -898.5389 -1140.599 -4902.930 -94.9033 
Sample 
Total 
Excluding 
missing obs. 
426 
339 
436 
238 
1569 
1253 
673  
484 
 
Note: Number in the parenthesis is the corresponding t-statistic. 
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Appendix Table A1  Q ratios for the four countries. 
 
 Indonesia Malaysia Korea Thailand 
Mean 4.264065 3.334891 0.282629 1.690953
Standard 
deviation 23.53792 21.58816 0.145943 3.549635
Maximum 341.8254 604.2455 0.870608 66.10495
Minimum 0 0 0 0
Median 1.33981 1.00306 0.23942 0.985605
Number >1 527 998 0 468
Number <1 282 985 709 484
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 a. Distribution of EFF among firms in Indonesia 
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Figure 1 b. Distribution of EFF among firms in Korea 
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Figure 1 c. Distribution of EFF among firms in Malaysia 
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Figure 1 d. Distribution of EFF among firms in Thailand 
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Figure 2a. Distribution of EFF among Korean firms with low debt 
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Figure 2b. Distribution of EFF among Korean firms with high debt 
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Figure 3a. Distribution of EFF over time, Indonesia 
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Figure 3b. Distribution of EFF over time, Korea 
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Figure 3c. Distribution of EFF over time, Malaysia 
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Figure 3d. Distribution of EFF over time, Thailand 
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